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Abstract
The state-of-the-practice Shuttle caution and warning system warns the crew of conditions
that may create a hazard to orbiter operations and/or crew. Depending on the severity of the
alarm, the crew is alerted with a combination of sirens, tones, annunciator lights, or fault
messages. The system uses data such as temperature, pressure, flow rates, and switch posi-
tions to determine whether there is an alarm situation. Fault messages directly annunciate
anomalies in the sensed parameters. The combination of anomalies (and hence alarms) in-
dicates the problem. Determining what problem a particular combination represents is not
trivial. Even with much training, it is sometimes difficult to determine the root cause of a set
of alarms. Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) systems are being developed to
address this difficulty. In many situations, an automated diagnosis system can help the crew
more easily determine an underlying root cause. Due to limitations of diagnosis systems,
however, it is not always possible to explain a set of alarms with a single root cause. Rather,
the system generates a set of hypotheses that the crew can select from. The ISHM Deci-
sion Analysis Tool (IDAT) assists with this task. It presents the crew relevant information
that could help them resolve the ambiguity of multiple root causes and determine a method
for mitigating the problem. IDAT follows graphical user interface design guidelines and
incorporates a decision analysis system. I describe both of these aspects.
1 Introduction
The goal of Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) is to ensure system
functionality. The field encompasses the set of activities that are performed in order
to identify, mitigate, and resolve faults with a system[1]. A fault is the root cause
of an anomaly, and an anomaly is a detectable undesirable state. Faults may or may
not lead to failure. ISHM systems compute and present information in a way that
makes it easier for humans to understand the operation of systems and also assist
humans in dealing with complexities that may arise. The ISHM Decision Analysis
Tool (IDAT) is a prototype of one such ISHM system.
The mission for IDAT is to develop and provide a demonstration of an operations
concept for assisting a spacecraft crew in making informed optimal decisions in the
face of uncertainty. IDAT can assist either space-based astronauts or ground-based
Mission Control Center (MCC) controllers. Thus, in this paper, “crew” means either
the on-board crew or the ground-based crew. Further, IDAT can assist the crew in
making a mitigation decision either when there is an uncertain cause for an anomaly
or when there is variability in the situational context, as explained below.
I begin by describing the domain for the IDAT prototype and the current state of
practice for spacecraft ISHM. I then describe the IDAT tool, first from the user’s
viewpoint and then from an implementation viewpoint. I conclude with a partial
list of future research that is required in order to improve a crew’s task of ensuring
spacecraft system functionality.
2 Domain
The domain for the IDAT demonstration is the Shuttle Reaction Control System
(RCS) propulsion system. The RCS is located in three separate modules on the
Shuttle, as shown in Figure 1. The forward module is in the nose area, forward of
the cockpit windows. The left and right modules are collocated with the Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) in the left and right OMS pods, near the tail of the
vehicle. The 16 forward jets, 14 left jets, and 14 right jets control the motion of
the Shuttle. Each jet is permanently fixed to fire in a particular direction: up, down,
left, right, forward, or aft. The selective firing of individual or combinations of
jets provides rotational (about an axis) or transitional (along an axis) movement.
Rotational movement is used for attitude control, whereas translational movement
is used primarily for velocity changes.
The RCS can be used alone to provide attitude control, or in combination with the
OMS or Main Propulsion System (MPS). The RCS is used throughout a typical
Shuttle mission. During the ascent phase (known as Operational Sequence (OPS)
1 in the flight software), the RCS is used for external tank (ET) separation in nom-
inal situations or to assist the MPS with additional roll control during off-nominal
(single-engine) situations. During the on-orbit phase (OPS 2), the RCS provides
attitude control for basic orbiting as well as during rendezvous and proximity op-
erations. Finally, during the de-orbit phase (OPS 3), the RCS is used to orient the
Shuttle prior to de-orbit burn to optimally reenter Earth’s atmosphere. (Figure 2
shows the operational sequences of a Shuttle flight.) A minimum number of jets
are required to be operational for each of these activities. If this minimum is not
achieved, for example, the ET and orbiter could collide during tank separation.
The RCS jets use monomethyl hydrazine as the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as the
oxidizer. These two propellants are hypergolic, which means that ignition occurs
spontaneously upon fuel-oxidizer contact, thus eliminating the need for an ignition
device. Although this approach increases system reliability, the volatile, corrosive,
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Figure 1. Location of Reaction Control System (RCS) on Shuttle
Figure 2. Operational sequences (OPS) of Shuttle flight software and the major mission
modes (MM) within a sequence
and poisonous nature of these propellants adds an operational risk if any leakage
occurs.
Each RCS module contains a collection of jets, a fuel tank, an oxidizer tank, and
two helium (He) tanks, along with associated feedlines, manifolds, and other sup-
porting equipment. Propellant flow (fuel and oxidizer) to the jets is normally main-
tained by pressurizing the propellant tanks with helium. Figure 3 shows a schematic
of the fuel side of an RCS module. The same equipment is duplicated for the oxi-
dizer side, as well as for the fuel and oxidizer sides of the other RCS module.
Because the aft RCS modules are collocated with OMS engines and both use the
same types of propellant, it is possible to interconnect (i’cnct) the two systems to
allow for propellant sharing. It is also possible to share propellant by establishing a
crossfeed (xfeed) between the two aft RCS modules.
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Figure 3. Schematic of the fuel side of an RCS module. Similar components exist for the
oxidizer side.
3 Background
In the current state of practice, the crew must monitor the RCS (as well as the other
Shuttle systems) by watching and scrutinizing spreadsheets of numbers. The state-
of-practice display for the summary of the status of the OMS and RCS systems is
shown in Figure 4. The top left and right upper half of the figure shows the quanti-
ties, pressures, valve positions, and fuel injector temperatures of the OMS, whereas
the area below the topmost horizontal lines shows the propellant, manifold, and jet
status of the RCS. The crew also has access to an RCS Redundancy Management
(RM) status display, shown in Figure 5. The RCS RM is a series of GPC (on-board
general-purpose computer) processes that detect, identify, and monitor such items
as failed jets (failed on, failed off, or failed leaking) and manifold valve status. The
results of the RM processes are displayed on the aforementioned display. The figure
shows the data for the forward RCS pod (signified by the “*” next to “RCS FWD
1”). As one can speculate, it requires considerable training to learn how to interpret
this display. Massive amounts of data about the system are presented, but it is not
trivial to extract the desired information.
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Figure 4. Shuttle propulsion system summary (GNC SYS SUMM) display
Figure 5. Shuttle RCS redundancy management system display
The crew (especially space-based) has many demands on their time throughout a
mission, with few respites. Extracting status information by scrutinizing spread-
sheets of numbers is a very demanding task. Parameter change notifications are
subtle, as is notification of detected anomalies. Further, mapping the data on a dis-
play to the crew’s mental model of the systems is challenging.
One approach to resolving this problem is to redesign the displays to be more task
oriented. To this end, the NASA Cockpit Avionics Upgrade (CAU) team created
new displays that incorporate many of the synoptic features of systems displays
in modern glass-cockpit aircraft, organizing graphical depictions of system com-
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ponents, such as valves, tanks, and flow lines, around a spatial arrangement that
emulates key aspects of the underlying system architecture. In addition, the design-
ers incorporated luminance and color-coding schemes into the graphics so as to
provide “at-a-glance” information concerning the current system configuration and
operating mode [2,3].
Improved displays make a significant difference in helping the crew extract relevant
information about a system. Nevertheless, in general, people tasked with monitor-
ing a system tend to get tired and decrease their vigilance, especially over a long
duration. They also tend to become complacent in situations where usually nothing
breaks. Computers are better suited to such repetitive work.
With this in mind, the underlying concept of operations for IDAT is that automation
is used where appropriate for the monitoring task. Additionally, other ISHM tech-
nologies are integrated with automated monitoring to decrease the crew’s workload
and to assist them in dealing with system complexity. In the case of IDAT, we
specifically refer to complexity due to uncertainty and variability.
Uncertainty arises when a set of anomalies can be explained by multiple root causes
and it is not possible to distinguish the true root cause. This can occur for a number
of reasons. First, the leading techniques for automated diagnosis rely on build-
ing a model of the system and comparing the predictions from the model to the
observations of the real system. Due to the complexity of spacecraft systems, it
is challenging to build high-fidelity models. Second, the complex interactions be-
tween components make it difficult to apply a variety of other diagnosis techniques,
due to the limited ability of the system experts to think of all possible problems in
advance and to determine how each problem could affect other components or sys-
tems. Third, it is impractical to place a sufficient number of sensors throughout the
system to be able to disambiguate between some root causes, and the sensors them-
selves tend to be less reliable than the systems being observed. In these cases of
ambiguous root cause, IDAT works in tandem with the crew to help them select a
strategy for mitigating the fault. It follows the task-oriented approach by presenting
germane information that enables the crew to make a decision by coordinating their
knowledge or constraints with that provided by the automation.
IDAT also assists the crew in dealing with complexity due to variability, by which
we mean that multiple mitigation procedures are possible for a given root cause. In
these cases, the procedure to follow is determined by the situational context. For ex-
ample, the crew’s best option may be to select the Isolate procedure to further refine
the cause of a left RCS leak when the leak is small, there is adequate troubleshoot-
ing time available, and the propellant reserves are plentiful. In contrast, if the leak
is large, the right RCS is feeding off the left because of a previous leak, the propel-
lant level is approaching critical levels, and only five minutes have elapsed since
launch, the best option may be to select the Abort procedure. Many of the standard
on-board procedures begin with a list of constraints that must be fulfilled to use that
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procedure and pointers to other procedures for cases where those constraints are not
met. IDAT assists by automating the evaluation of constraint satisfaction as feasible
given the available sensors. It provides the crew with a list of constraint-satisfying
options, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of each option.
The following section describes the IDAT tool. I introduce the elements displayed
on it sequentially and reference the labeled areas of Figure 6.
Figure 6. IDAT main display
4 IDAT
The operational concept of IDAT is that the system health state determination is
automated as much as possible and the crew are alerted only when a problem they
need to assist with is detected.
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When the propulsion systems’ monitored parameters are nominal, the IDAT display
shows only the mission elapsed time (MET, shown in the upper right of Figure
6) and a status summary for each system. The six systems shown are the main
propulsion system (MPS), the forward RCS (F RCS), the left OMS (L OMS), the
left and right RCS (L RCS and R RCS), and the right OMS (R OMS). They are
arranged as shown because the aft RCS and OMS share a pod on each side of the
shuttle, the F RCS is independent, and the MPS is not of concern once in orbit and
can be deleted from the display without changing the order of the other systems.
The size of each status summary area can be adjusted to reflect its importance
during a particular phase of flight. The enlarged RCS summary areas reflect the
choice of domain for the prototype system. When all monitored parameters are
nominal, the status is shown as “OK” and the border is color-coded green. 1
When a problem is detected, the border changes to red and a summary of the prob-
lem (e.g., “LEAK - FUEL”) appears. (Figure 9 shows this view whereas Figure 6
shows the expanded version of the summary area.)
Simultaneously, the remaining IDAT display appears. The upper-left section, la-
beled “Problems,” shows the current list of problems using phrasing that mimics
the phrasing used in the current Caution and Warning system. In our example, the
problem is “L RCS LEAK - FUEL,” meaning a leak has been detected in the left
RCS fuel propellant leg.
An automated diagnosis system coordinates with the monitoring system to deter-
mine the root cause of the problem. As discussed previously, determining the root
cause is not always easy. Humans frequently create systems whose behavior, par-
ticularly in fault cases, is so complex that even the creators cannot fully predict it.
The root cause of a fault may not be any single component, but rather a possibly
complex interaction between components. Further, because of a variety of factors,
such as low-fidelity models or inadequate number of sensors, the diagnosis system
is not always able to determine a single root cause, but rather generates a set of
possible root causes that explain the anomalous behavior. Such is the case for this
problem. There is an inadequate amount of data to discern the location of the leak.
IDAT thus displays the top-ranked root cause options (in the middle of the display,
labeled “Root Cause Options” and preceded by the letters “A” to “E”).
The root causes have characteristics associated with them that provide additional
information to the crew. We selected three characteristics that we believe are use-
ful. Others may also be important and closer interaction with the eventual users is
an important step in defining a complete set of characteristics. The current set of
characteristics includes criticality, likelihood, and confidence, defined as follows:
1 To increase the crew’s comfort level that the automation is still working, rather than
displaying just an “OK,” it may be desirable to introduce a heartbeat-like display that shows
the current distance from perfection as, for example, an intensity level of the “OK” or as
symbols that grow/shrink to represent the distance.
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• Criticality refers to a scale of possible ramifications of a root cause (a.k.a. fault).
The highest criticality is assigned to faults that could result in loss of human life,
while the lowest criticality is assigned to nuisance faults that lead to only a slight
degradation of current or potential future performance. The criticality of a fault
is due both to the misbehaving components and to the current phase of flight.
• Likelihood refers to the prior probability that the components (not sensors) called
out in the root cause may fail. The prior probability considers such factors as the
mean time between failure (MTBF) metric, as well as any previous anomalous
behavior of a component during the current mission.
• Confidence refers to the level to which the diagnosis system believes the be-
havior is explained by the implicated components. For example, model-based
diagnosis compares observations of the real system with the predictions from a
model. In the case of a fault, discrepancies between the observed behavior and
the predicted normal behavior occur. These discrepancies are then used to iden-
tify (diagnose) the fault. In practice, the observations from the system (relayed
by sensors strategically placed throughout the system) may not be received in
time to reach a hypothesis. These missing alarms caused by a time-out event that
occurs before a sensor reading is received decrease the confidence of the diagno-
sis system in its stated hypothesis. It is also conceivable that the sensor has failed
and is providing an incorrect reading. In other words, the confidence character-
istic refers to what the sensors are currently (and recently) saying, whereas the
likelihood refers to the history of the system components. Note that if sensors
and components are treated equally, it may be possible or desirable to combine
the likelihood and confidence values into a single value.
The three rectangles to the right of the text of each root cause encode the values
for the three characteristics. The value of each characteristic is shown by the fill
amount within its associated rectangle. Three distinct hues of gray represent the
three characteristics: the darkest gray is associated with criticality, medium gray
is associated with likelihood, and the lightest gray is associated with confidence.
To draw extra attention to higher criticality values, the fill for criticality uses gray
to represent lower criticality values, but adds color to represent higher criticality
values, using yellow to represent moderate criticality, and red to represent high
criticality.
A weighted summation of the values of the three characteristics determines the
ranking of the root cause options and thereby the order in which they are displayed.
The crew can adjust the weight afforded each characteristic to better reflect personal
ranking of the importance of each characteristic. IDAT will automatically resort the
list of root causes as the crew adjusts (moves) the blue sliders of the “Sort-criteria
weights” area. The three subrectangles defined by the two blue sliders map to the
three characteristics. We use several cues to help the crew associate a subrectangle
with an individual characteristic. First, the subrectangles use the same order as
used in the “Root Cause Options” area: criticality on the left, likelihood in the
middle, and confidence on the right. Second, the same color represents an individual
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characteristic in both areas. Third, the sliders change the size of the subrectangles in
the “Sort-criteria weights” area and within the rectangles above each characteristic
label in the “Root Cause Options” area.
In addition to the value of these characteristics, we believe it is important for the
crew to know the amount of time until a mitigation option must be started and the
amount of time until a particular root cause leads to a critical situation (i.e., failure).
These two times are associated with each root cause option and shown next to the
characteristics as “OPS Timeline.” The time to criticality (“ttc,” shown by the red
bar) depends on the mission mode (i.e., the functions of the system during different
phases of flight) and encodes how long it takes until critical ramifications result
from the root cause. The time to respond (“ttr,” shown by the yellow bar) takes into
consideration the amount of time required to perform a mitigation activity.
Any one of the root causes presented by IDAT could be the true root cause. The
automated system does not have enough information at the current time to distin-
guish between them, so it is up to the crew to do so. To assist with this process, we
recall some of the parameters from the original state-of-practice monitoring sys-
tem, namely the parameters or cues that are relevant for this particular problem. As
shown in the upper-right corner of Figure 6, rather than the numeric display format,
we present the relevant cues graphically. Also, to ease detection of out-of-range
conditions, we use color coding to supplement a parameter’s value with informa-
tion about its relevant position with respect to a hard limit threshold (redline) and
acceptable range that is specific to each parameter. If the parameter’s current value
is within the acceptable range, the bar is color-coded green. When it approaches the
limit threshold, the bar and surrounding rectangle both turn yellow. When the value
reaches the limit threshold, the bar and surrounding rectangle both turn red. Note
that the bar continues to update its position to reflect updates in sensed values.
Beside the relevant parameters, we also provide the crew with timing information.
This is shown within the “OPS Timeline” rectangle between the relevant cues and
“Problems” area at the top of Figure 6. The OPS timeline shows the mission elapsed
time within that operational sequence, the time available to respond, time to criti-
cality, and time until the end of the current operational sequence. The elapsed time
is shown by gray filling of the rectangle. The timeline also includes a countdown
timer until the end of the sequence, and the activity that signifies that point (“ET-
SEP,” or external tank separation, in our case). The time to respond refers to the
latest time a response can be started to mitigate the highest-ranked root cause op-
tion shown in the “Root Cause Options” section, i.e., the root cause with label “A,”
and is shown graphically by the yellow “respond” line and “time-to-respond” text
value. The time to criticality refers to the time until the situation becomes critical if
the highest-ranked root cause (i.e., root cause “A”) is the true cause of the problem,
and is shown graphically by the red “criticality” line and “time-to-criticality” text
value.
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To help the crew assess the criticality, IDAT displays both text and a graphical
presentation of the impact this problem has to the mission (from the start of the
current operational sequence to landing). This information is shown in the “Mission
Impact” area located below the “Problems” area.
IDAT displays any critical actions that the crew absolutely must not take for that
type of problem, as shown in the “Do NOT” area.
To visualize the root causes, the crew can select the “expand” option (shown as a
sideways triangle similar to its use in many mainstream computer applications) to
replace the text with a summary representation of the schematic for the affected
system, as shown within the “L RCS” status summary area. The components of
each root cause are highlighted in red to assist with visualization of the part of
the system that is being implicated within the text of the selected root cause. The
crew can select any of the other root causes to visualize the other options. Note
that throughout the display, anything shown in blue is selectable. The crew can
also bring up a more detailed version of the schematic that also shows numeric
values for associated parameters. The display, obtained by selecting the “Details”
button, is shown in Figure 7. A root cause may implicate components from multiple
systems. That is, a root cause may state that the symptoms can be explained by a
combination of a fault of a component in the left RCS and a component in the right
RCS. To visualize this situation, the crew can “expand” the status summary area
for both the left and right RCS. It is also possible to view the “Details” windows
for both modules side by side.
At this point, IDAT has presented all the relevant information (barring additional in-
formation that may be recommended from domain experts during follow-on work)
that could help the crew resolve the ambiguity of multiple root causes and begin
to determine a method for mitigating the problem. The most important action for
the crew is to ensure system functionality. This is aided by the proper diagnosis
of the root cause, but can be accomplished even when the root cause cannot be
determined.
To assist the crew with the task of determining a mitigation strategy, IDAT incorpo-
rates a decision analysis system. We use a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) deci-
sion network tool, Netica, to automatically rank available mitigation options based
on the inputs of relevant cues and knowledge about the effect of a mitigation option
on resources. The ranked set is displayed in the “Mitigation Options” area, along
with the effect on resources (“Pros” and “Cons”) and any associated flight rules
(“Constraints”). The pros and cons can be shown either as color-coded rectangles
(as shown in Figure 6) or text (as shown in Figure 8). The effects on resources
are classified as benefits (pros) and drawbacks (cons) of vehicle damage, crew re-
sources, and propellant resources. These three factors were used in the prototype
implementation, but can be modified to incorporate domain expert guidance.
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Figure 7. IDAT detailed schematic display
The numbers (1 to 5) to the left of each mitigation option enable automatic access to
relevant procedures that the crew needs to accomplish. The crew may also choose
to review details of an option to help them make a better selection. We have not
yet completely implemented this capability, but rather just provided hooks for the
process. In particular, clicking on one of the numbered blue boxes currently brings
up only the titles for the relevant procedures, as shown in Figure 9. Potentially, it
may be more useful to display both the title and the complete procedure. In Section
7, I discuss introducing automation into procedure execution to further reduce the
crew’s workload.
In summary, we created an operational concept in the embodiment of a tool (IDAT)
that works in tandem with the crew. It is a decision support tool that assists the crew
in determining an appropriate mitigation strategy when confronted with a problem
with an uncertain cause. IDAT provides much germane information in the form of
context and relevant cues to augment the crew’s knowledge and help them select
the best action. In addition to helping the crew deal with uncertainty, it can also
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Figure 8. IDAT expanded pros and cons within the Mitigation Options area
be valuable in determining a mitigation strategy in situations with variable context.
It integrates a variety of automated systems (monitoring, diagnosis, and decision
support) with the engineering systems of a complex vehicle like the Shuttle or CEV
(Crew Exploration Vehicle, the replacement for the Shuttle slated to fly around
2012), but does it in a manner that keeps the human in the center of the process.
In the following sections, I provide more detailed descriptions about the underlying
pieces of IDAT. I begin by describing the scenario used to demonstrate the concepts,
the architecture of the tool, and the details for each subsystem. I conclude with a
discussion of future work necessary to further develop the operational concept.
13
Figure 9. IDAT expanded pros and cons within the Mitigation Options area
5 Scenario
The IDAT prototype uses the Shuttle RCS as a demonstration platform. As a illus-
tration case, we introduce a leak in one of the components of the fuel propellant leg
of the left RCS. The crew’s task is then to determine the location of the leak and
decide how to proceed with the mission. A diagnosis system produces from three
to five possible root cause options, some with different values for fault criticality
and time to criticality. The available mitigation options are to abort the mission, to
ignore the leak, to attempt to isolate the leak, to initiate a crossfeed from the right
RCS, or to initiate a crossfeed (known as an interconnect) from the left OMS. We
can vary the time the leak begins and the size of the leak.
6 Prototype Details
The architecture of the prototype is shown in Figure 10. The crewmember – and
thus the graphical user interface (GUI) – is at the center. Connected to the GUI
are the data system, the monitoring system, the diagnosis system, and the decision
analysis system. All five systems are implemented in C and C++ and run under
Linux. The data system runs as an independent process, writing its output to a file.
The other four systems are combined into a process and receive input from that file
as well as from the user/crewmember.
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Figure 10. IDAT architecture
The purpose of the GUI is to integrate the output from the other systems, call the
appropriate systems under the appropriate conditions, display relevant information
to the crew, and enable the crew to interact with that information. The graphics
portion is implemented in OpenGL.
The purpose of the data system is to generate a data stream for concept demonstra-
tion. It uses the RCS parameters from the STS-114 data (Shuttle Discovery mission,
July, 2005). Because there wasn’t an actual leak during the flight, we had to simu-
late one. The biggest challenges were establishing how to simulate a leak in each of
four possible configurations (normal, secured, crossfeeding, and partial crossfeed-
ing) and determining how to transition between the eight configurations (the four
above crossed with ok or leaking). It was also tedious to map the desired parameter
to the parameter identification (MSID) used by the Shuttle program. The data sys-
tem appears on the user interface in the relevant cues area, the OPS timeline area,
and the actual state of schematic components. It should also provide data for the
“Mission Impact Timeline” but currently does not. Instead, we use representative
data for that portion.
The purpose of the monitoring system is to monitor incoming data for anomalous
behavior. For the IDAT prototype, we used a substitute system that only looks for
a leak. When it detects a leak, it informs the GUI, which causes the main area to
appear. The monitoring system’s output appears in the “Problem” area.
The purpose of the diagnosis system – DSS for diagnosis system substitute – is to
identify root causes of an anomalous situation that the monitoring system detected.
This too is a substitute system. It uses a model-based approach. The model is a men-
tal model, the computation uses a biological neural network, and the computation
results are entirely hand coded. DSS provides root causes in the various configura-
tions where the leak could arise and considers the state of both RCS modules in its
determination of root cause. Further, DSS sets the likelihood and confidence values
to semi-realistic values. However, for full demonstration of the GUI, we adjusted
some of the values to better show the color-coding and sorting features. DSS also
sets the criticality, time-to-respond, and time-to-criticality values. In a full IDAT
implementation, these values are expected to originate in a different type of sys-
tem that considers not just the root cause but also any redundancies available, the
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mission profile, and other relevant factors. The DSS output appears on the GUI in
the “Root Cause Options” section and as the state of schematic components per se-
lected root cause (both in the status summary area and in the detailed schematics).
Finally, the purpose of the decision analysis system is to rank mitigation options
for highest utility (goodness). IDAT uses Netica to compute utility for each of the
five mitigation options based on a basic model of five inputs (entered into chance
nodes or nature nodes because they model the nature or reality of the world – the
likelihood of it being in its possible states [4], also known as current-state nodes)
and three expert-knowledge nodes (also chance nodes but referred to as outcome-
state nodes). 2
The Netica model created for IDAT is shown in Figure 11. The current-state nodes
encode the situational context via the parameters leak rate, time to criticality, pres-
sure difference between the two aft RCS modules, propellant quantity, and state
of the other RCS module. Each of these is specific to the leg with the propellant
leak. The single decision node of the network, named Options, displays the calcu-
lated utility for each of the five possible mitigation options when a leak is detected.
These options are to ignore the problem, attempt to isolate it, establish a crossfeed
to use propellant from the other RCS, interconnect to the OMS to use its propel-
lant, or abort the mission. Each of these options comes with issues that must be
considered. These issues – resources used, vehicle damage that may occur, and
crew factor, including such things as the workload of the crew – are coded in the
values assigned to the expert-knowledge or outcome-state nodes of the network.
Finally, the utility node, simply named Utility in the model, computes the answer
to the question “Given the current states, how happy will I be with the decision,
considering that it will likely result in the expected future states?”
The biggest challenge with the decision analysis system is parameter optimization.
The conditional probability tables (CPTs) have to be manually initialized to reflect
the expert knowledge so the network can better answer the question “What should
we do, what is the best choice, under the conditions encoded by the input nodes?”
This is a difficult process that requires much adjustment. Also, the model is fairly
rudimentary in that the decision network does not incorporate the possible root
cause in its view of the situational context. That is, the utility computation will
result in the same vector of values regardless of the root cause of the problem. The
output of the decision network appears on the UI in the “Mitigation Options” area.
The five options are ranked by utility, given the inputs represented directly by or
derived from the relevant cues (upper right corner of the display), whereas the pros
and cons encode the values computed for the expert-knowledge nodes.
2 Unlike current-state nodes, the values for outcome-state nodes are not input as evidence,
but rather are computed by Netica to capture the goodness of the outcome state for the
current-state nodes and the decision that is selected.
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Figure 11. Netica model created for IDAT
7 Future Work
Through this small demonstration system, we learned that many issues must be
resolved to ensure that IDAT provides the crew with appropriate and desirable as-
sistance in assuring the health of the complex systems required to successfully and
optimally 3 accomplish their mission. In this final section, I present six categories of
issues that need to be resolved to flesh out the operational concept: user interaction,
data system, diagnosis system, decision support system, mitigation procedures, and
human factors (display) issues.
User Interaction
• Involve the eventual users in the development of the operations concept to incor-
porate the domain expertise necessary to evaluate each proposed concept.
• Resolve under what conditions IDAT appears.
• Consider benefits of having IDAT appear immediately when a problem is de-
tected versus delaying its appearance based on the crew’s other work. Investigate
how to determine and track crew’s current tasks and relative priorities.
• Investigate benefits of hiding the problem if a automated mission manager de-
termines the problem will not have an effect on this mission. (Requires trend
information from a prognostics system.)
3 There is a saying in aviation: “A good landing is one you can walk away from. A great
landing is one that leaves the plane usable for another flight.” Similarly, a successful mis-
sion is one that does not result in loss of human life. An optimal mission is one that also
accomplishes all the major goals and leaves the vehicle in a state that requires only minimal
refurbishment for another flight.
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• Resolve if and how to enable the crew to defer addressing a problem.
• Resolve how the crew should interact with the procedures that appear when a
mitigation option is selected. Possible options include: (1) The computer exe-
cutes all actions automatically with crew intervention only when automation is
not possible. (2) The crew performs each action manually to remain proficient
on procedures and locations of switches. (3) The crew may choose some combi-
nation of automation and manual action.
• Resolve whether mitigation options should be filtered by root cause, redundan-
cies, mission goals, procedures available, crew’s other tasks, etc.
• Determine whether to consider available mitigation procedures in pruning the set
of root causes presented to the crew.
• Resolve what happens when additional problems are detected while the crew is
still working on the previous problem. Determine what type of new problem (and
priority of problem) should cause IDAT to interrupt the crew’s interaction with
the current problem.
• Resolve what happens when there have been multiple problems associated with
a single system. Consider displaying just the most recent problem versus a his-
torical list of problems and their resolution.
• Determine desired interaction for the mission impact timeline.
• Investigate use of other modalities such as aural (including speech) and tactile.
Data System
• Involve domain experts to select a plausible and convincing scenario.
• Incorporate flight rules and other constraints into displayed information.
• Incorporate mission impact information.
Diagnosis System
• Involve ISHM domain experts for information on diagnosis systems current ca-
pabilities. Relay information to diagnosis system experts about desired future
capabilities.
• Replace the hand-coded diagnosis system with a suitable automated diagnosis
system.
• Determine how to compute criticality. Likely need to consider root cause, avail-
able redundancies, and the mission.
• Determine how to compute likelihood.
• Determine how to compute confidence, its meaning, the types of diagnosis sys-
tems it applies to, and under what situations it can be combined with likelihood.
• Determine whether there are characteristics of a root cause that are important in
addition to criticality, likelihood, and confidence.
• Determine how to summarize multiple singletons into a single root cause item.
• Determine whether to merge two root cause options that have a duplicate set of
recommended mitigation options.
• Determine whether and how to incorporate a troubleshooting system into IDAT.
18
The troubleshooting system would enable the crew to interact directly with the
diagnosis system to find out the cause of and how to decrease the ambiguity.
• Determine how to incorporate an explanation facility.
Decision Support System
• Expand model to include the possible root cause in its decision computations.
• De-cluster utility values. The current network produces values for utility of the
best option and worst option that may vary by as little as a few percent. It may be
more useful to a crewmember to receive more polarized advice on the goodness
of the possible mitigation options.
• De-cluster pro/con values. Adjust the computation of the values for the expert-
knowledge nodes to increase the range of possible values, when appropriate.
Mitigation Procedures
• Incorporate ideas from PRS (Procedural Reasoning Systems, SRI, 1988-1990)
for extracting appropriate procedure for a given situation (context-aware proce-
dure retrieval).
• Determine if and how to create procedures on the fly for novel situations.
• Determine if and how to interlink existing procedures to accommodate novel
situations.
Human Factors (Display)
• Determine how many root cause options to display based on how many root
cause options a person can interpret and extract meaningful information from.
· If fewer than all options are presented, determine the filtering criteria.
· If all options are available, but only some are displayed, determine how best to
interact with all options.
• Determine how to deal with root cause updates received while the crew is inves-
tigating a previously received root cause, say RC1. Consider the case when RC1
is not in the new list and the case when RC1 moves up or down in the new list.
Determine how the dynamics of displaying the new list of root causes will affect
the crew’s analysis or other tasks.
• Establish how cross-subsystem (in general, across multiple subsystems) multiple
faults are displayed.
• Determine how to display interactions or interdependencies among root causes.
• Resolve how to visualize interconnect and crossfeed operations.
• Determine how to display double micro-switch valves. RCS uses double micro-
switch valves, where each valve produces two sensor values: one for open and
one for closed. If a valve is in transition, both values may indicate open (because
it has not yet closed).
• Relevant cues are correlated (e.g., leak rate, time to criticality, and quantity).
Determine whether to combine correlated cues into a single derived parameter
or display each cue separately.
19
• Time to criticality and time to respond are uncertain estimates. Determine how
to relay the probability distribution associated with them to the user.
This is just a short list of issues that should be resolved. Many additional issues will
likely arise as IDAT is connected to proper automated systems that provide data,
monitoring, and diagnosis services, and as experts are linked into the project.
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